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Abstract 
In this article, I contend that asylum should at times act as a form of reparation for 
past injustice. This function, I argue, stems from states¶ special obligation to provide 
asylum to refugees for whose lack of state protection they are responsible. After 
suggesting that the development of a theory of asylum as reparation necessitates a 
diachronic approach, I outline the conditions under which asylum should function 
reparatively, and draw on the reparations framework within international law to 
suggest that asylum can provide refugees with meaningful restitution, compensation 
and satisfaction. In particular, I seek to identify the conditions under which asylum 
constitutes the most fitting form of reparation for the harm of refugeehood that is 
available to states. Finally, I explore the question of how direct the causal link 
between a state¶s actions and a refugee¶s flight must be for the former to owe 
asylum to the latter. 
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Towards some refugees, we may well have obligations of the same sort that 
we have toward fellow nationals. This is obviously the case with regard to 
any group of people whom we have helped turn into refugees. The injury we 
have done them makes for an affinity between us: thus Vietnamese refugees 
had, in a moral sense, been effectively Americanized even before they 
arrived on these shores (Walzer, 1983, p. 49). 
 
 
How should the institution of asylum operate? Asylum is often viewed as 
having one of two core moral functions. Firstly, asylum is frequently conceived as a 
response to a fundamental KXPDQLWDULDQLPSHUDWLYHWRPHHWUHIXJHHV¶SUHVVLQJQHHG
for protection against serious harm. A second position, which enjoyed its heyday 
during the Cold War, emphasises aV\OXP¶V SROLWLFDO IXQFWLRQ DV DQ H[SUHVVLRQ RI 
moral condemnation of the persecutory or otherwise illegitimate actions of refugee-
producing states (Price, 2009).  
 
In this article, I contend that asylum should at times also assume a third 
important moral function: as a form of reparation for past injustice. This potential 
function, I argue, stems from a special obligation on the part of states to provide 
asylum to refugees for whose lack of state protection they are morally responsible, 
whether through their military interventions, support for oppressive regimes, or 
imposition of damaging economic policies. Asylum should be conceived not only as 
SOD\LQJDµSDOOLDWLYH¶ humanitarian role or as expressing condemnation (Price, 2009, 
p. 7), but also as potentially providing a means by which states can rectify the harm 
they caused to individuals by turning them into refugees. 
 
In a restrictionist era marked by strong hostility towards asylum-seekers, the 
task of partly re-conceptualising asylum in light of such an intuitive and widely 
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accepted moral idea as reparation is both timely and important. Indeed, recognition 
RIDV\OXP¶VUHSDUDWLYHFDSDFLW\KDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWRUHPRELOLVHVXSSRUWIRUDV\OXPWR
at least some extent. As a matter of moral psychology, reparative arguments often 
exert a more powerful influence than humanitarian considerations (Butt, 2009, p. 16; 
Tan, 2007, p. 286), such that concern for refugees is more easily generated when 
individuals feel somehow connected to their plight. For instance, Matthew Gibney 
(1999, p. 29) has shown how the huge popularity of Kosovan refugees in Western 
European states compared to non-European refugees can be at least partially 
explained by a sense of being implicated in their situation, given the intervention of 
these states in the Balkans. 
 
My main goal in this article is to develop a provisional account of the 
conditions under which asylum should function as a form of reparation for past 
injustice. I begin this process by arguing that, in contrast to the synchronic focus of 
much existing work on the ethics of asylum, this task necessitates a diachronic 
approach. After presenting working definitions of asylum and reparation, and 
providing key clarifications, my exposition of the conditions under which asylum 
should act reparatively involves discussion of the principle of reparation, the 
external causes of forced migration, reparative responsibility for the unjust harm of 
being turned into a refugee, and the ways in which asylum might act as a form of 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction. In particular, I seek to identify the 
conditions under which asylum constitutes the most fitting form of reparation for the 
harm of refugeehood that is available to states, considering factors such as UHIXJHHV¶
choice of reparation and the efficiency of asylum as a form of refugee protection. 
Finally, I address the question of how direct the causal link between a state¶VDFWLRQ
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DQG UHIXJHHV¶ ODFN RI VWDWH SURWHFWLRQ must be for the former to owe reparative 
asylum to the latter. In making my argument, I aim to show how the forging of a 
conceptual connection between asylum and reparation raises important broader 
questions on how asylum is accessed, and the various ways in which past injustices 
can be remedied. 
 
The Need for a Diachronic Approach 
 
The notion of a special obligation to provide asylum to refugees for whose 
lack of state protection an external state is responsible has received relatively brief 
scholarly treatment,1 with some viewing it in passing merely as a potential voluntary 
motivation for states to provide asylum to certain refugees (Carens, 2003, p. 100; 
Hathaway and Neve, 1997, p. 195; Miller, 2007, p. 227) or as one important 
consideration for refugee burden-sharing schemes (e.g. Gibney, 2007, p. 66). This 
may stem from the fact that much work on the ethics of asylum and migration tends 
to be primarily synchronic in character,2 focusing largely on the current needs and 
rights of refugees and migrants on the one hand, and citizens of receiving states on 
the other, rather than considering how pre-existing relationships between them may 
generate moral obligations to allow entry. This synchronic focus reflects the 
character of the moral theories that have typically been applied to this issue, which 
tend to adopt an impersonal perspective from which historical relationships are 
largely discounted. Utilitarianism recommends weighing up the current interests of 
those affected by asylum policy (Singer and Singer, 1988), while liberals evaluate 
such policy in light of whether it treats DOO FRQFHUQHG DV µIUHH DQG HTXDO PRUDO
SHUVRQV¶&DUHQV 1987, p. 255), whereas humanitarian approaches ground the duty 
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to provide asylum in, for instance, DµULJKWRIKRVSLWDOLW\¶.DQW 2006 [1795], p. 82) 
or D µprinciple of mutual aLG¶ :DO]HU  S 45). Although communitarian 
approaches take account of pre-existing relationships within particular communities, 
they tend in practice to ignore the ethical relevance of harmful past relationships 
between the state and outsiders (Gibney, 2004, p. 51). 
 
From this synchronic perspective, the idea that asylum should act 
reparatively makes little sense, for it focuses solely on the fact of refugees¶ current 
plight, rather than the processes which caused it. This leads to analysis of the 
VWUHQJWK RI UHIXJHHV¶ FODLPV IRU SURWHFWLRQ WR EH XQGHUWDNHQ LQ LVRODWLRQ IURP
historical considerations. A diachronic approach, which recognises not only the 
current fact of displacement but also its provenance, is therefore vital for the 
development of a theory of asylum as reparation. 
 
Despite such discussions of a special obligation to provide asylum to 
refugees whom a state has caused to flee, there appears to be a dearth of work which 
explicitly links asylum to reparations. In contrast, the extensive literature on 
reparations focuses on proposed reparations for crimes such as slavery, colonialism 
and genocide, focusing especially on transitional justice.3 Moreover, work on 
reparations within refugee studies has focuseGVWURQJO\RQUHIXJHHV¶VWDWHs-of-origin 
(see Bradley, 2006). Bradley (2008) has analysed refugee reparations in the context 
of repatriation, while legal scholars have proposed that states-of-asylum should be 
able to claim compensation from refXJHHV¶VWDWHV-of-origin for providing asylum to 
them (Garry, 1998; Lee, 1986,IDV%UDGOH\SDUJXHVµ>U@HIXJHHVKDYH
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ORQJEHHQLQWHUWZLQHGZLWKWKHODZDQGSROLWLFVRIUHGUHVV¶WKHQWKHODFNRIDWWHQWLRQ
paid to the links between asylum and reparation is striking.  
 
Definitions and Clarifications 
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to sketch my understanding of key terms 
DQGWRPDNHLPSRUWDQWFODULILFDWLRQV)LUVWO\P\XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHWHUPµUHIXJHH¶
goes beyond the legal definition within the 1951 Refugee Convention, and follows 
Shacknove (1985) in viewing the refugee broadly as an individual whose protective 
link with his or her state-of-origin has been severed. This definition covers not only 
WKRVHZLWKµZHOO-founded fear of persecutiRQ¶DVWKH&RQYHntion has it, but anyone 
facing serious harm while lacking state protection. It also transcends the standard 
legal distinction between refugees and internally displaced persons, with the latter 
ordinarily only being seen as such after having crossed an international border.  
 
 My understanding of asylum is closely related to this view of the refugee. 
)XQGDPHQWDOO\ PRGHUQ DV\OXP LV µWKH VDQFWXDU\ RU UHIXJH JLYHQ WR IRUHLJQHUV
XVXDOO\ UHIXJHHV E\ DQ\ VRYHUHLJQ VWDWH¶ *LEQH\  S . This minimal 
definition raises the question of what asylum provides refuge from. Applying 
6KDFNQRYH¶V DSSURDFK ZH FDQ DGG WKDW DV\OXP¶V SULPDU\ IXQFWLRQ LV WR SURYLGH
refuge from the threat of serious harm, by creating a new protective link between the 
refugee and the state-of-asylum. However, there appears to be no reason in principle 
why we should limit ourselves to the prevailing Western image of asylum as 
encompassing only those who have already fled to another state, or why we should 
see a refugee¶V crossing of an international border as affecting the strength of his or 
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her reparative claim for asylum. If asylum fundamentally consists of surrogate 
protection, then it is the lack of protection within refugees¶ states-of-origin, rather 
than the fact of their flight across a border per se, which grounds their moral 
entitlement to asylum. Rather than limiting asylum to those who have managed to 
reach another VWDWH¶V WHUULWRU\ DV\OXP should be conceived as also extending to 
those to whom, despite being located outside its territory, a state might offer 
residence. This could take the form of current resettlement programmes ± in which 
some third states provide residence to refugees who are at risk in their states of first 
asylum (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2011, p. 3) ± 
but could also potentially be broadened so as to include refugees remaining within 
their states-of-origin. Resettlement, on this broader conception, can justifiably be 
seen as a form of asylum itself. 
 
Thirdly, I unGHUVWDQGUHSDUDWLRQVEURDGO\DVµWKHHQWLUHVSHFWUXPRIDWWHPSWV
WRUHFWLI\KLVWRULFDOLQMXVWLFHV¶%DUNDQS[L[,IROORZWKHVWDQGDUGGLYLVLRQ
within international law which sees reparations as having three components: 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction (International Law Commission, 2001, p. 
52). Within this framework, while restitution refers to attempts to restore the status 
quo before a violation occurred, compensation is a monetary or material transfer, 
whereas satisfaction entails apologies or guarantees of non-repetition. Despite the 
EUHDGWKRIWKHWHUPµSDVWLQMXVWLFH¶KHUH,XVHLWWRUHIHUVROHO\ to the past injustice 
which led to an individual being a refugee in the present. 
 
It is, however, important to QRWH WKDW WKH WHUP µUHSaration¶ FRQWDLQV DQ
ambiguity with respect to the question of by whom the repair should be provided. 
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Some use the term to refer to the repair of injustice by any agent, while others use it 
only to describe redress specifically provided by the perpetrator. Without attempting 
to settle this issue here, I use the term in the latter sense, and follow Thompson 
(2002, p. 42) in distinguishing between reparation, which is provided by the 
perpetrator, and remedy ZKLFK FDQ µUHVXOW IURP WKH JRRG ZLOO«RI D WKLUG SDUW\¶. 
This choice reflects the fact that my main argument concerns the allocation of 
responsibility for refugee protection, and that a humanitarian conception of asylum 
already demands that third-SDUW\VWDWHVSURYLGHDUHPHG\LQ7KRPSVRQ¶VWHUPV 
 
Beyond these definitions, several key clarifications are in order. Firstly, my 
argument is not that states only have reparative duties to refugees. States hold such 
duties towards anyone for whose harm they are responsible, and it would be morally 
arbitrary generally to privilege the reparative claims of refugees over those of any 
other individual. Secondly, in focusing on the special obligations of states-of-
asylum, I do not wish to deny the fact that reparative responsibility also frequently 
lies with refugees¶ states-of-origin, or may be shared. Thirdly, I do not argue that 
asylum should only be provided reparatively. Using asylum purely as a form of 
reparation would be highly unjust overall, as it would greatly weaken refugee 
protection by excluding all those refugees whose plight was caused by their own 
state alone. Indeed, I view the notion of reparative asylum, and reparative justice in 
general, as most plausible when embedded in a pluralist account of responsibility 
and, more widely, of justice, without which it would be incomplete (see Caney, 
2005, p. 765).  Consequently, reparative asylum must be, as far as is possible, made 
to be complementary to the current form of asylum. Furthermore, I recognise that 
there are occasions in which asylum would be a highly inappropriate form of 
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reparation. I aim to isolate the conditions under which asylum can function 
reparatively, not to claim that it invariably does so as a general rule. 
 
Moreover, my focus in this article is on the reparative obligations of 
Northern liberal democratic states to refugees. While my theory applies in principle 
to any state, WKHGUDVWLFGLIIHUHQFHVLQVWDWHFDSDFLW\EHWZHHQµ1RUWK¶DQGµ6RXWK¶DUH
such that an application of my WKHRU\WRWKHµ6RXWK¶would raise some very different 
issues, which stretch beyond the confines of this article. While I focus here on the 
individual provision of asylum DFURVVWKHJOREDOµ1RUWK¶, such an application to the 
µ6RXWK¶ZRXOGUHTXLUHGLVFXVVLRn of whether and how reparative asylum could and 
should be offered when this individualistic approach is impracticable, due to factors 
such as situations of mass influx from which such states are unable to insulate 
themselves effectively. These important questions must be deferred for future 
discussion. 
 
 Finally, my decision to focus specifically on asylum as a reparative tool 
requires some justification. Indeed, other forms of refugee protection ± such as the 
WKUHH µGXUDEOH VROXWLRQV¶ RI YROXQWDU\ UHWXUQ UHVHWWOHPHQW DQG ORFDO LQWHJUDWLRQ 
pursued by UNHCR ± may also potentially act reparatively, by restoring UHIXJHHV¶
loss of state protection. That said, it is important to note that, on my view, two of 
these durable solutions are closely linked to asylum. Conceptually, I have already 
indicated that resettlement can be conceived as providing asylum whereas, 
SUDFWLFDOO\ WKH SURYLVLRQ RI DV\OXP FDQ FRQVWLWXWH D VWHS WRZDUGV UHIXJHHV¶ ORFDO
integration. While Bradley (2008, p. 300) has already convincingly argued that 
µUHWXUQ LWVHOIFDQEHVHHQDVD IRUPRIUHGUHVV¶DQDFFRunt is also needed of when 
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asylum can function reparatively, particularly in light of the fact that refugees have 
an immediate need of protection and reparation which asylum can meet, whereas 
such return is contingent on typically longer-term improvements in their states-of-
origin. 
 
The Conditions of Asylum as Reparation 
 
The claim that a state owes asylum as reparation for the harm of refugeehood is not 
an argument open to every refugee. It follows that there are certain conditions under 
which this special obligation to provide asylum obtains. In order to identify these 
conditions, it is necessary first to outline the basic moral claim underpinning my 
argument: 
 
When an agent bears outcome responsibility4 for causing another agent unjust 
harm, the first agent bears a special obligation to provide the second agent with 
the most fitting form of reparation for that harm available. 
 
 My intention is not to defend this principle of reparation fully ± which would 
constitute a full philosophical project in itself ± but to take for granted its moral 
force, and to apply it to the ethics of asylum. It does, however, require some general 
explanation, if only briefly. As a species of special obligation, it fits within the 
ethical paradigm of partialism (see Gibney, 2004, ch. 1), which includes moral 
norms concerning only certain individuals on account of pre-existing relationships 
among them. This principle fundamentally concerns the assignment of 
responsibility, stating that it is the responsible party who must provide redress. 
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If the principle of reparation formulated above is applied to the case of a 
refugee seeking asylum in another state, the basic conditions under which asylum 
should function reparatively flow relatively simply. They can be stated as follows: 
  
(1) 7KH UHIXJHH¶V ODFN RI VWDWH SURWHFWLRQ PXVW KDYH EHHQ FDXVHG E\ WKH
actions of an external state; 
(2) That state must bear outcome responsibility for causing this lack of 
protection;  
(3) That refugee must either have been unjustly harmed, or be at risk of 
unjust harm, as a result of this lack of protection; 
(4) The provision of asylum by that state must be the most fitting form of 
reparation for that harm available. 
  
This list is not designed to be exhaustive, but rather to identify some of the 
most salient conditions under which asylum should function reparatively. It is also a 
simplification for the purposes of initial exposition given that, in cases in which 
multiple states bear joint responsibility for refugees¶ SUHGLFDPHQW WKHZRUG µVWDWH¶
would have to be pluralised. I now discuss and defend each of these conditions in 
turn, identifying in the process some of the key premises of my account. 
 
The Externalist Approach to Refugees 
 
7KHILUVWFRQGLWLRQVWDWHVWKDWWKHUHIXJHH¶VODFNRIVWDWHSURWHFWLRQmust have been 
caused by the actions of an external state. This could occur when an external state 
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either causes a refugee-producing situation that the state-of-origin is unable to halt, 
or when it causes or otherwise enables the state-of-origin to produce refugees. 
Evidently, this condition assumes that states can and do generate refugees outside 
their territories. Although this might seem obvious ± after even a cursory glance at 
the numbers of refugees generated by recent foreign interventions such as those in 
Iraq and the Balkans ± this assumption runs counter to a surprisingly prevalent 
internalist approach to refugees within both the political and academic arenas.5 The 
EDVLFLQWHUQDOLVWDVVXPSWLRQLVWKDWWKHSULPDU\GULYHURIUHIXJHHV¶PRYHPHQWVLVWKH 
DFWLRQVRIUHIXJHHV¶VWDWHV-of-origin. If internalism is correct, then the development 
of a theory of asylum as reparation would be fruitless, as reparative responsibility 
would lie exclusively, or at least predominantly, with refugees¶ states-of-origin. 
Demonstrating the inadequacy of internalism is therefore a crucial step in 
developing this theory. 
  
 Nevertheless, various scholars have shown that many refugee movements 
indeed have exogenous causes. Some have argued that although internal persecution 
may be the immediate precipitant of flight, this can be often merely 
µHSLSKHQRPHQDO¶6FKXFNSWKDWLVDPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIGHHSHUVWUXFWXUDO
ills for which external states bear primary responsibility. Others view international 
economic developments as a trigger for flight, tracing certain refugee movements 
back to the effects of externally imposed structural adjustment programmes (Betts, 
2009, p. 140; Marfleet, 2006, pp. 44-56). Castles (2003, p. 18) has gone as far as 
DUJXLQJWKDWµWKH1RUWKGRes more to cause forced migration than to stop it, through 
enforcing an international economic and political order that causes 
XQGHUGHYHORSPHQWDQGFRQIOLFW¶ However, it appears that the most accurate view of 
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the causes of forced migration lies between the poles of internalism and externalism. 
While extreme internalism disregards clear examples of recent internationally-driven 
displacement, full externalism ± which would imply that responsibility for refugees 
always lies with external states ± overlooks thH IDFW WKDW µHYHQ LQ RXU JOREDOLVHG
ZRUOGVRPHLQMXVWLFHVDUHVLPSO\ORFDO¶*LEQH\, 2004: 235). 
 
State Responsibility 
 
The second condition asserts that, as well as having caused refugees¶ lack of state 
protection, the external state must also bear outcome responsibility for it. In 
formulating this condition, I draw on David 0LOOHU¶V FDUHIXO GLVWLQFWLRQV EHWZHHQ
causal, outcome and remedial responsibility (Miller, 2007, ch. 4). For Miller, causal 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\FRQFHUQVµZK\VRPHWKLQJKDSSHQHG¶whereas outcome responsibility 
UHODWHV WR µZKHWKHU D SDUWLFXODU DJHQW FDQ EH FUHGLWHG RU GHELWHG ZLWK D SDUWLFXODU
RXWFRPH¶ Unlike causal responsibility, outcome responsibility exists only when 
WKHUH LV D µIRUHVHHDEOHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ«DFWLRQDQG«UHVXOW¶ (Miller, 2007, pp. 
87-90). Remedial responsibility, in contrast, denotes µWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZHPD\KDYH
WRFRPHWRWKHDLGRIWKRVHZKRQHHGKHOS¶0LOOHUS For our purposes 
here, we can add to this typology the notion of reparative responsibility, which 
FRPELQHV 0LOOHU¶V GLVWLQFWLRQV WR FODLP WKDW LW LV WKH DJHQW who is outcome 
responsible for a situation who also bears remedial responsibility for it. 
 
 What implications does this condition have for cases in which external states 
generate refugees? Firstly, note that this condition does not include any requirement 
that LQ DGGLWLRQ WR EHLQJ RXWFRPH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU UHIXJHHV¶ IOLJKW the refugee-
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producing state must also bear specifically moral responsibility for it, in the sense of 
deserving moral praise or blame for its actions (Miller, 2007, p. 89). This is not to 
deny that such states often bear great moral responsibility for causing individuals to 
become refugees. Rather, I have not built the notion of moral responsibility into my 
theoretical framework in order to ensure that it accommodates the intuition that, in 
0LOOHU¶VZRUGVµ$PD\«KDYHEHHQDFWLQJLQDZD\WKDWLVPRUDOO\LQQRFHQWRUHYHQ
admirable, and yet may owe compensation to P since he is outcome responsible for a 
ORVVWR3¶0LOOHU7, p. 90).  
  
 Secondly, however, this condition does imply that if a state bears only causal 
but not outcome responsibility for producing refugees, then it bears no specifically 
reparative responsibility to provide the refugees in question with asylum. This could 
be the case, for instance, if it were genuinely not reasonably foreseeable that a 
VWDWH¶V FRXUVH RI DFWLRQ ZRXOG SURGXFH UHIXJHHV For instance, the rapidly 
industrialising states of the nineteenth century may bear some causal responsibility 
for setting in motion the processes which have led to climate change, which is often 
regarded as a potential catalyst of significant future displacement. However, 
assuming that this future displacement was not reasonably foreseeable given the lack 
of scientific understanding of the likely environmental impacts of industrialisation at 
the time, it would be difficult to argue that they bear any retrospective outcome or 
moral responsibility for it (see Caney, 2005, p. 761).  
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The Unjust Harm of Refugeehood 
 
The third condition requires that the refugee must either have been unjustly harmed, 
or be at risk of unjust harm, as a result of the actions of an external state. It may 
seem obvious that all stages of displacement are typically harmful and unjust, given 
the suffering and turmoil which refugees so often experience both as a result of the 
forces provoking their flight and the adjustment subsequently required in their new 
locations. Indeed, it can be strongly argued that causing individuals to become 
refugees violaWHVDSXWDWLYHµULJKWQRWWREHGLVSODFHG¶6WDYURSRXORXRUµULJKW
WRVWD\¶2EHUPDQ0RUHRYHU$UHQGW¶VFODVVLFDFFRXQWRIUHIXJHHVDVEHLQJ
GHSULYHG RI µD ULJKW WR KDYH ULJKWV¶ ± RIWHQ HQWDLOLQJ WKH µORVV RI WKHLU KRPHV
DQG«WKH HQWLUH VRFLDl texture into which they were born and in which they 
HVWDEOLVKHG IRU WKHPVHOYHV D GLVWLQFW SODFH LQ WKH ZRUOG¶ $UHQGW  >@ S
293) ± aptly highlights the vulnerability which refugeehood so frequently engenders. 
Even if refugees are only at risk of harm, this risk alone can create additional harms 
in itself, for instance, by preventing movement to their country-of-origin and 
creating insecurity. Nevertheless, it is worth briefly clarifying the notions of harm 
and injustice underlying my argument here.6   
 
As Feinberg (1987, ch. 1) has arguedµKDUP¶ can be profitably understood as 
HQWDLOLQJDVHWEDFNWRRQH¶VEDVLFLQWHUHVWV This process can be characterised either 
objectively or subjectively, as the impairment of basic human capabilities (Sen, 
1993), or in terms of suffering. While the task of characterising the idea of justice 
fully goes far beyond the scope of this article, it is closely related to notions of 
fairness and desert. Now, it is conceivable that harm may be inflicted justly. The 
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paradigmatic case may be that of retribution, when an offender is deemed to deserve 
the harm suffered as punishment. It is also conceivable that an individual may be 
harmed by being caused to be a refugee, but not unjustly so. One potential case of 
µMXVW GLVSODFHPHQW¶ LV WKH IOLJKW of a dictator, such as that of Colonel Gaddafi in 
2011. 
 
The Fittingness of Reparative Asylum 
 
The fourth condition, outlined above, is based on the conviction that states 
have an obligation to provide the most fitting form of reparation to refugees for 
whose plight they are responsible that is available. I understand fittingness here in 
terms of the extent to which a particular measure is able to repair a particular harm 
for all who have suffered from it. In order to ascertain fittingness, it is necessary to 
examine not only the features of the harm and the benefit offered as reparation for it, 
but also the wishes of the beneficiaries in order to ensure sensitivity. It might be 
thought that this notion of fittingness should include concern for whether the 
reparation provided is proportionate to the gravity of the harm caused. However, I 
set aside considerations of proportionality in this context on the grounds that the 
harms of refugeehood, which often entail gross violations of human rights, typically 
are sufficiently severe to render proportionality unattainable, even if the relatively 
µPXQLILFHQW¶DFWVHHDe *UHLIISRISURYLGLQJDV\OXPLQWKHULFKµ1RUWK¶
is undertaken. 
 
 0\GLVFXVVLRQRIDV\OXP¶V UHSDUDWLYH ILWWLQJQHVV will proceed in two steps. 
Firstly, I ask whether asylum can be a fitting form of reparation at all, before 
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addressing the fourth condition directly, seeking to identify the circumstances under 
which asylum can constitute the most fitting form of reparation available. 
 
The Ongoing Threat of Harm 
 
To begin, there is one clear circumstance which must obtain for asylum to 
constitute a fitting form of reparation at all. While I have already provisionally 
defined asylum as refuge from the threat of serious harm, we can add to this that 
asylum provides refuge from a threat that is ongoing, at least at the time when it is 
granted. Without risk on return and lack of state protection from his or her state-of-
origin, the individual is not, or is no longer, a refugee, properly understood. It 
follows from this that asylum will only remain a fitting form of reparation for the 
harm of refugeehood if that risk persists. If the refugee was never granted asylum by 
the responsible state while the risk was ongoing, the latter will still be obliged to 
provide the refugee with other forms of reparation, such as compensation, in his or 
her current place of residence once the risk has lapsed. Alternatively, if the 
responsible state has already provided reparative asylum during this period, then it 
can nevertheless provide the former refugee with a right to remain, but this will no 
longer be strictly asylum as reparation, but rather settlement or perhaps citizenship as 
reparation. It would be an open question in each case as to whether the period of 
asylum offered would constitute sufficient reparation for the harm suffered by the 
ex-refugee, or whether additional reparative measures would also be morally 
required from their state-of-asylum. 
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Asylum and the Various Forms of Reparation 
 
As I observed above, reparations have three main forms under international 
law: restitution, compensation and satisfaction. I now turn to the issue of whether 
asylum can provide these specific forms of reparation fittingly.  
 
Restitution is sometimes expressed as the principle of restitutio in integrum, 
that is, the attempt to restore the victim to their state before the violation occurred 
(De Greiff, 2006, p. 3). However, a frequent criticism of this principle is that some 
crimes are so abhorrent as to be irreparable (e.g. Bradley, 2005, p. 2). It could be 
argued from this that, while asylum may provide future protection, it is emphatically 
incapable of rectifying the losses of displacement or erasing subsequent trauma. 
Furthermore, the ideal form of restitution for some refugees may be the recreation of 
the previous situation in their country to permit their safe return. However, this is 
often impossible, for the state-of-DV\OXP¶V DFWLRQV PD\ KDYH XQOHDVKHG IRUFHV LW
subsequently cannot check. After arguably causing the collapse of the Iraqi state 
through its invasion in 2003, the United States may have been unable, at least not 
immediately, to prevent the rise of insurgents who took advantage of the ensuing 
lawlessness (Dodge, 2006). Full restitution, therefore, may be unfeasible. 
 
 Nevertheless, asylum can provide a meaningful degree of restitution in one 
key respect. The state may be unable to erase the traumas of flight or enable return 
for those who desire it, but it can offer refugees state protection of the sort they 
previously had. Clearly, this is not an exact recreation of the status quo ante, for the 
refugees gain protection from a different state than the one by which they were 
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previously protected. However, to this extent, restitution lies within the responsible 
VWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\ 
 
 It could be argued that this principle of restitution can justify only 
differential levels of protection in another state, depending on the conditions 
obtaining for each individual before their flight. If the goal of restitution is to restore 
WKHYLFWLPWRWKHLURULJLQDOVLWXDWLRQ LWIROORZVWKDWDUHIXJHHIURPDµIUDJLOHVWDWH¶
such as Somalia would be entitled to less protection than both the state-of-DV\OXP¶V
citizens and refugees from stronger states, such as Iran. However, this may illustrate 
that restitution is not the only principle of justice relevant to asylum, for 
considerations of equity and solidarity may well justify exceeding the basic 
requirements of restitution and providing equal protection to citizens and all 
refugees in the state alike. Exclusive adherence to the requirements of restitution 
through differential treatment may mandate lower levels of rights for some refugees 
within their state-of-asylum, and thereby prevent their full inclusion within it. Some 
may also find the existence of such inequalities now within a society after these 
UHIXJHHV¶ DUULYDO DV PRUH PRUDOO\ WURXEOLQJ WKDQ WKRVH WKDW ZHUH RQFH across 
societies before it (Wellman, 2008, p. 122).   
  
Compensation, in contrast, is sometimes seen as required when full 
restitution is impossible (De Greiff, 2006, p. 455). Even if it were conclusively 
shown that asylum cannot provide restitution fittingly, it can nevertheless play a 
compensatory role. Indeed, gaining refugee status LQ WKH JOREDO µ1RUWK¶ Wypically 
entails access to a bundle of rights, perhaps including welfare provisions, which may 
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be monetary or material in form, thereby providing the kind of reparation described 
E\*UHLIISDVDµVHUYLFHSDFNDJH¶ 
 
Satisfaction, again in contrast, is the most symbolic form of reparation, 
allowing the responsible state formally to acknowledge its wrongdoing and make 
guarantees of non-repetition. Matthew Price (2009, p. 70) has demonstrated the 
capacity of asylum to express and symbolLVHWKHVWDWH¶VYDlues and aims. However, 
while he focuses predominantly on asylum as an outward-looking expression of 
condemnation, there is no reason in principle why it cannot also be an inward-
looking expression of contrition and apology, thereby acting as a form of 
satisfaction.  
 
 It can be argued that if this symbolic dimension is lacking, asylum cannot 
meaningfully function reparatively, with some arguing that material or monetary 
transfers constitute reparation only when they are accompanied by 
acknowledgement that they are playing a reparative role (see Lu, 2007, p. 209). This 
would preclude a form of de facto asylum as reparation, whereby asylum provides 
reparation without being acknowledged as doing so by the state-of-asylum. 
Although the provision of asylum to an Iraqi refugee by the United Kingdom might 
be reparative in effect, given its role in the last Iraq war, such effects remain 
steadfastly unacknowledged by the state.  
 
Having established that asylum is capable of constituting a fitting form of 
reparation for the harms of refugeehood, I now turn to address the fourth condition 
directly: can asylum be the most fitting form of reparation for refugees available? 
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While recognising the limitations of asylum both as a form of refugee protection and 
a reparative tool, I answer affirmatively, suggesting further that asylum often has 
reparative advantages over alternative forms of refugee protection. 
 
The Most Fitting Form of Reparation Available? 
 
Under what conditions does asylum constitute the most fitting form of 
reparation for the harm of refugeehood available? As several theorists have argued, 
the provision of permanent asylum is only one means of discharging a more general 
duty to protect refugees (and, by extension, to provide reparation to them), which 
may potentially be fulfilled through temporary asylum, safe havens, in situ aid, or 
even military intervention (Miller, 2007, p. 225; Price, 2009, p. 164; Wellman, 2008, 
p. 129). Indeed, I recognise that these alternatives may at times conceivably 
constitute the more fitting form of reparation. The reparative fittingness of any one 
form of refugee protection depends on at least two variables: the choice of the 
refugee, and the ability of states to provide it to all refugees to whom they owe it. 
 
5HIXJHHV¶&KRLFH 
 
Some theorists do not merely argue that states may discharge their duties to 
refugees in various ways besides the provision of asylum, but also contend that such 
states should have substantial discretion in deciding how to discharge them. Miller 
(2007, p.  IRU LQVWDQFH VHHV UHIXJHHV¶ FKRLFH RI SURWHFWLRQ DV MXVW RQH IDFWRU
which can be outweighed by a number of more state-centric considerations. 
However, where reparation is concerned UHIXJHHV¶ FKRLFH must be given 
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considerable weight. This choice should be both between asylum and other forms of 
reparation and, if asylum is indeed chosen, the opportunity to choose the state in 
which to be granted asylum. Having had their agency and freedom of movement so 
restricted by their displacement, special emphasis should be placed upon it when 
providing reparation. Indeed, after causing or contributing to their displacement, 
KHHGLQJ UHIXJHHV¶ ZLVKHV LV WKH OHDVW that responsible states can do. Moreover, 
reparative fittingness cannot be evaluated solely in terms of whether the harm is 
actually rectified, but must also take into account how the reparation is experienced 
E\WKHYLFWLP,WPD\EHWKDWDV\OXPLVWKHUHIXJHH¶VSUHIHUUHGIRUPRIUHSDUDWLRQRU
that another form of redress would be more sensitive. As Bradley (2005, p. 21) 
FRPPHQWV µUHIXJHHV«PD\KDYHVHULRXVTXDOPVDERXWDFFHSWLQJUHVWLWXWLRQIURPD
VWDWH WKDW VHULRXVO\ YLRODWHG WKHLU ULJKWV¶ HVSHFLDOO\ LI asylum was insensitively 
provided in a state which the refugee in question would regard as the enemy. 
+RZHYHU0LOOHU¶VDSSURDFKLVMXVWLILHGLnsofar as it recognises that refugees¶ choice, 
despite its great importance, can conceivably be overridden by other considerations, 
such as the need to provide a more efficient form of reparation in order to provide 
reparation to many in a climate of scarce resources. 
 
It could be objected here that respecting refugees¶ choice of the state in 
which they wish to be provided asylum is inconsistent with the logic of reparation: 
for surely it must be the state that caused the refugees¶ lack of state protection which 
bears the obligation to provide them with reparative asylum on its territory. 
However, two replies can be made here. Firstly, the obligation to provide reparative 
asylum is not absolute and can be outweighed by the force of refugees¶FKRLFHWREH
granted asylum elsewhere. Secondly, there may be ways in which the responsible 
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state can heed refugees¶ wishes for asylum in a different state while nevertheless 
providing them with reparation; for instance, either by providing another form of 
reparation, such as compensation, to refugees who have taken humanitarian asylum 
in another state, or conceivably by providing their alternative states-of-asylum with 
financial support for providing asylum. 
 
Efficiency 
A furthHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQUHOHYDQW WRDV\OXP¶VUHSDUDWLYHILWWLQJQHVV LV WKDWRI
efficiency. Some scholars, such as Price (2009, p. 12), have echoed recent 
arguments made by developed states that in-region protection is far more efficient 
than providing asylum in the µNorth¶, freeing up resources which could then be 
channelled towards the maximisation of overall refugee protection (and, by 
extension, refugee reparation). Without attempting definitively to settle this issue 
here, several observations are in order. Firstly, as Alexander Betts (2006, p. 159) has 
shown, it is not clear that this is invariably the case: if efficiency is theorised so as to 
encompass social and political, rather than merely financial, considerations, then 
asylum in the µNorth¶ may at times be more efficient than in-region protection. 
Secondly, the concept of efficiency has been invoked in debates over refugee 
protection often without identifying what good is to be maximised, and in whose 
interests (Betts, 2006, p. 153). While states have their own interests in achieving 
optimal efficiency in refugee protection, considerations of efficiency are only 
relevant to the reparative fittingness of one or other form of refugee protection if the 
proposed alternative to asylum allows for reparation to be made to all refugees who 
are owed it, or at least more than would otherwise be possible.  
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Reparative Alternatives to Asylum 
 
Beyond the identification of these two broad conditions under which asylum 
can act as the most fitting form of reparation, can anything more general be said? It 
might be thought that asylum, at least as it currently operates, is in fact a poor 
candidate for the most fitting form of refugee reparation in practice. De Greiff 
SYLHZVµFRPSOHWHQHVV¶DVDGHVLGHUDWXPIRUDQ\UHSDUDWLRQVSrogramme, 
ZKLFK KH GHILQHV DV µWKH DELOLW\ RI D SURJUDP WR FRYHU DW WKH OLPLW WKH ZKROH
XQLYHUVH RI SRWHQWLDO EHQHILFLDULHV¶ +RZHYHU WKH GRPLQDQW :HVWHUQ PRGHO RI
asylum ± which is taken to encompass only refugees who have fled to another state 
± is incapable of achieving this completeness alone, and must be supplemented by 
other reparative programmes in order to do so. Indeed, a number of biases and 
ZHDNQHVVHVZLWKLQWKLVPRGHOKDYHEHHQLGHQWLILHGQRWOHDVWDQH[LOLFRUµH[SDWULDWH
ELDV¶ DORQJVLGH D µSUR[LPLW\ ELDV¶ 3ULFH  S  %\ SURWHFWLQJ RQO\ WKRVH
able to reach another state, this model arguably offers protection arbitrarily, creating 
unfair gendered, generational, disability and class dimensions to asylum, as many 
refugees able to flee are young, able-ERGLHG PHQ DEOH WR SD\ VPXJJOHUV¶ IHHV
(Gibney, 2000, pp. 315-316). This is without mention of the fact that asylum 
remains largely restricted to those who are deemed to have demonstrated a µZHOO-
founded fear RISHUVHFXWLRQ¶XQGHUWKH1 Convention. 
 
While recognising these limitations, it is important to recognise that reforms 
WR FXUUHQW DV\OXP V\VWHPV FRXOG UHDOLVH DV\OXP¶V XQWDSSHG UHSDUDWLYH SRWHQWLDO
&HUWDLQO\ DV\OXP¶V FXUUHQW RSHUDWLRQ OHDYHV PDQ\ UHIXJHHV XQSURWHFWHG DQG LV
skewed in favour of some over others. Yet a strong case can be made, not only for 
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broadening eligibility for asylum beyond persecution but, as I indicated earlier, also 
for including resettlement, broadly construed, within our understanding of asylum. 
This inclusion has the strong potential to counteract these biases and to strengthen 
DV\OXP¶VUHSDUDWLYHFDSDFLW\:KLOHUHVHWWOHPHQW is currently viewed as discretionary 
and operates on a small scale, with states being FULWLFLVHGIRUµVHOHFWLQJWKH³EHVWDQG
the EULJKWHVW´ UHIXJHHV¶ 3UHVVp DQG 7KRPVRQ  S , an expansion of such 
programmes according to the criterion of need rather than desirability would allow 
those least able to flee to secure reparative asylum.  
 
Moreover, while cautioning against any general claim that one or another 
form of refugee protection is invariably more reparatively fitting than the 
alternatives, there are some grounds for believing that asylum tends to constitute a 
more fitting form of reparation for displacement than either in-region aid or 
development. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, while such aid may provide 
temporary subsistence to those displaced, it is unlikely to constitute a durable 
solution which ensures the effective protection RI UHIXJHHV¶ IXQGDPHQWDO ULJKWV 
Secondly, asylum is often more targeted to the individual than in-region assistance. 
As de *UHLII  S  KDV DUJXHG µGHYHORSPHQW SURJUDPV KDYH D YHU\ ORZ
UHSDUDWLYHFDSDFLW\IRUWKH\GRQRWWDUJHWYLFWLPVVSHFLILFDOO\¶7KHLUDLPRIPHHWLQJ
basic needs, he suggests, means that such programmes are better seen as attempts to 
fulfil their minimal socio-economic rights as citizens, rather than specifically as 
victims.  
 
Asylum also has one reparative advantage over both in-region aid and 
military intervention: while these alternatives tend to be long-term and indirect in 
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their effects, with military intervention often causing short-term instability and 
exacerbating or creating further refugee crises, asylum can immediately provide 
protection and rights to those displaced (despite, of course, not being a full substitute 
for this kind of long-term remedy). Drawing on de *UHLII¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ
µUHSDUDWLRQV LQ WKHLU VWULFW VHQVH DQG WKH UHSDUDWLYH effects RI RWKHU SURJUDPV¶
(Grieff, 2006, p. 471), while aid may be reparative in effect, it does not itself 
FRQVWLWXWH D VWURQJ IRUP RI UHSDUDWLRQ 9LHZLQJ DWWHPSWV DW µH[SRUWLQJ MXVWLFH¶
(Wellman, 2008, p. 129) as a reparative alternative to asylum must, therefore, be 
viewed with caution. 
 
Potential Objections 
 
Having presented this case for asylum¶VSRWHQWLDOWREH the most fitting form of 
refugee reparation available, it must be recognised that there are various objections 
that could be made against my approach as developed so far, or implications which 
require discussion. For instance, it could be argued that, in the event of a just war, 
any refugees displaced as a result of it are not owed reparative asylum by the 
intervening state (see Blake, 2007), that the special obligation to provide reparative 
asylum can be outweighed by other more pressing moral considerations or that, in 
WKHFRQWH[WRIµVFDUFHHQWU\SODFHV¶*LEQH\SUHSDUDWLYHDV\OXPZRXOG
inevitably prioritise refugees who are not necessarily most in need of protection. It is 
a moot point, given the frequent reluctance of states to admit their own wrongdoing, 
how they could be compelled in practice to provide reparative asylum, and which 
actors are best placed to assign reparative responsibility for refugees. In an era in 
which refugees are shuttled between different states-of-asylum, in practice the 
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question would surely arise of whether reparative justice could permit one state to 
pay a poorer state to provide asylum to refugees it has harmed. Given lack of space, 
however, here I focus on only one potential objection: that the special obligation to 
SURYLGHUHSDUDWLYHDV\OXPRQO\KROGVZKHQWKHFDXVDOOLQNEHWZHHQWKHVWDWH¶V action 
DQGUHIXJHHV¶ODFNRIVWDWHSURWHFWLRQ is at least fairly strong.  
 
The Question of Directness 
  
The paradigmatic examples in which states have a special obligation to 
provide asylum are cases in which they have directly created refugees, due to clearly 
identifiable actions such as military intervention. Often, however, such a direct 
causal link either does not exist or cannot be identified. Firstly, external states may 
FUHDWHWKHµSUHGLVSRVLQJIDFWRUV¶ ZKLFKJHQHUDWHUHIXJHHVEXWQRWWKHµSUHFLSLWDWLQJ
HYHQWV¶ 5LFKPRQG  S  ,W KDV RIWHQ EHHQ DUJXHG IRU LQVWDQFH WKDW
(XURSHDQ FRORQLDO UXOH µVHW WKH VWDJH¶ IRU PDQ\ SRVW-independence refugee 
movements (Anthony, 1989, p. 574), and was thereby a necessary, albeit 
insufficient, condition for their occurrence.  
 
Secondly, many refugees are generated by extremely complex chains of 
events which are embedded in similarly convoluted social, political, economic and 
cultural systems in which a large number of diverse actors are implicated to various 
extents. Refugees can be created by the simultaneous actions of various agents, 
whether coordinated or not, creating the somewhat formidable epistemic problem of 
pinpointing individual degrees of responsibility, especially once counterfactual 
considerations are taken into account. Matters of causality are of course open to 
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reasonable disagreement among equally informed observers, and the assignment of 
responsibility may ultimately come down to calls of judgement.7 Given that the huge 
complexity of causal chains far outstrips human ability to discern and comprehend 
them fully, contestation and uncertainty when assigning reparative responsibility is 
almost inevitable.  
 
Locating a Threshold 
 
In existing treatments of reparative obligations to refugees, some scholars 
have implicitly accepted that there is some threshold of causal directness below 
ZKLFKWKHVWDWH¶VUHSDUDWLYH responsibilities evaporate (e.g. Gibney, 2004, p. 56). For 
instance, Price (2009, p. 3) states that:   
 
When a state is directly UHVSRQVLEOH IRU PDNLQJ D IRUHLJQHU¶V KRPHODQG
XQLQKDELWDEOH«UHVWRUDWLYHMXVWLFHGHPDQGVWKDWWKHVWDWHUHFWLI\FRQGLWLRQVRI
iQVHFXULW\WKDWLWKDVGLUHFWO\FDXVHG«6RPHPD\EHWHPSWHGWRDUJXHIXUWKHU
that states are responsible for refugee flows, and are therefore specially 
obligated to refugees, merely because they offered diplomatic or political 
support to a persecutory regime or imposed destabilizing structural 
DGMXVWPHQW SURJUDPV RQ GHYHORSLQJ HFRQRPLHV«7KDW KRZHYHU VWUHWFKHV
the concept of special obligation, created by direct responsibility, too far. 
 
What rationale is there for fixing this kind of threshold? In short, it appears 
to be strongly linked to the notion of proportionality, in the sense of whether an 
external state is sufficiently LPSOLFDWHGLQUHIXJHHV¶ODFNRIVWDWHSURWHFWLRQ for them 
to be obliged to provide asylum reparatively. Such a threshold is required because, if 
refugees¶ ODFNRIVWDWHSURWHFWLRQFDQRQO\EH WHQXRXVO\ OLQNHG WRDVWDWH¶VDFWLRQV
then providing them with asylum reparatively is not a proportionate response. As the 
causal link between the VWDWH¶V DFWLRQV DQG WKH UHIXJHHs¶ situations becomes more 
 29 
strained, it might be that that state is obliged to provide a lesser form of reparation, 
such as limited compensation, perhaps at the same time as providing reparation on 
humanitarian grounds. Indeed, it would be unfair to impose an identical obligation 
towards a set of refugees on two states, when one was the main architect of the 
intervention which produced them, while the other played a peripheral role (note 
how the impact of the US military dwarfed that of, say, Poland in the last Iraq war). 
Overall, then, the objection is justified and a fifth condition should be introduced, 
VWDWLQJWKDWµWKHFDXVDOOLQNEHWZHHQWKHVWDWH¶VDFWLRQDQGWKHUHIXJHH¶VODFNRIVWDWH
SURWHFWLRQPXVWEHDWOHDVWIDLUO\VWURQJ¶ 
 
If some threshold of directness is needed in order to ensure proportionality, 
WKHTXHVWLRQDULVHVRIZKHUHWKLVWKUHVKROGVKRXOGEHIL[HGDQGZKDWµIDLUO\VWURQJ¶
really means here ,QGHHG 3ULFH  S  GRHV QRW H[SODLQ ZK\ µPDNLQJ D
IRUHLJQHU¶V KRPHODQG XQLQKDELWDEOH¶ FURVVHV WKH WKUHshold, while the effects of 
µGHVWDELOL]LQJVWUXFWXUDODGMXVWPHQWSURJUDPV¶GRQRW&HUWDLQO\ WKHUH LVQRVLPSOH
algorithm for determining this threshold or for deciding whether each case meets it. 
Nevertheless, a scalar approach to the question of directness may be useful here. As 
0LOOHU  S  VXJJHVWV DV µWKH >FDXVDO@ FKDLQ EHFRPHV ORQJHU DQG PRUH
WRUWXRXV UHVSRQVLELOLW\ GLVVLSDWHV¶ 7KLV PHDQV WKDW WKH ZHaker the causal link 
between the refugees¶ SOLJKWDQGWKHVWDWH¶VDFWLRQVWKHORZHUWKHUHparative capacity 
of asylum in that state. We may not be able to specify exactly where to draw the 
line, but we can distinguish, at least roughly, between the varying strength of 
UHIXJHHV¶ GLIIHUHQW UHSDUDWLYH FODLPV IRU DV\OXP )RU LQVWDQFH DQ ,UDTL UHIXgee 
claiming asylum in the United States since its invasion appears to have a stronger 
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reparative claim than a Rwandan seeking asylum in Belgium on account of its past 
colonial rule. 
 
Assigning Responsibilities 
 
Moreover, although we may not be able to attribute external responsibility 
for the production of refugees precisely, we may nevertheless be justified in 
continuing to claim that certain states bear a special obligation to those refugees. 
+HUH0LOOHU¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ identifying and assigning responsibility is useful. 
While identifying UHVSRQVLELOLW\LQYROYHVµORRNLQJWRVHHZKRLIDQ\ERG\PHHWVWKH
UHOHYDQW FRQGLWLRQV IRU EHLQJ UHVSRQVLEOH¶ assigning UHVSRQVLELOLW\ HQWDLOV µD
decision to attach certain costs or benefits to an agent, whether or not the relevant 
FRQGLWLRQV DUH IXOILOOHG¶ :KLOH LGHQWLILFDWLRQV RI UHVSRQVLELOLW\ FDQ EH µFRUUHFW RU
LQFRUUHFW¶ DVVLJQPHQWV RI UHVSRQVLELOLW\ FDQ RQO\ EH µMXVWLILHG RU XQMXVWLILHG¶
(Miller, 2007, p. 84). 
 
Now, responsibility can be assigned to any agent, whether or not they played 
any part in causing the harm. However, assignments of specifically reparative 
responsibility can also be justifiably made. For instance, we may be unable to 
disaggregate the contributions of each state to a refugee movement accurately, yet 
nevertheless institute a system which assigns responsibility for a proportion of those 
refugees to all those which had at least some role.8 Such assignments would, for 
LQVWDQFH LPSOLFDWH WKH ZRUOG¶V ODUJHVW SROOXWHUV LQ WKH HYHQW RI WKRVH Ileeing the 
effects of climate change.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have sought to develop a provisional theory of asylum as 
reparation for past injustice, which explains when a state has a special obligation to 
provide asylum reparatively. I have shown that this obligation obtains when: (1) the 
UHIXJHH¶VODFNRIVWDWHSURWHFWLRQKDVEHHQFDXVHGE\WKHDFWLRQVRIDQHxternal state; 
(2) that state bears outcome responsibility for causing this lack of protection; (3) the 
refugee has either been unjustly harmed, or is at risk of unjust harm, as a result of 
this lack of protection; (4) the provision of asylum by that state is the most fitting 
form of reparation for that harm available; and (5) WKHFDXVDOOLQNEHWZHHQWKHVWDWH¶V
action and the refXJHH¶VODFN of state protection is at least fairly strong.  
 
As I indicated earlier, my argument has left various issues unresolved which 
require further attention. In particular, given that, as I commented earlier, any theory 
of asylum as reparation for past injustice raises wider questions of how asylum 
should be accessed and how asylum claims should be decided, it requires a 
convincing account of how states with an obligation to provide reparative asylum 
would prioritise refugees, especially given the currently limited political space for 
fashioning inclusive asylum policies in many Northern states (Gibney, 2004, pp. 
244-246). After all, although states should strive to make humanitarian and 
reparative forms of asylum work together in a complementary fashion, it could be 
argued that refugees with reparative claims are nevertheless doubly deserving: not 
only are they at risk of serious harm and thereby entitled to asylum on humanitarian 
grounds, but they are also deserving of reparative asylum specifically from a 
particular state. There is, therefore, a possibility that an incorporation of the 
 32 
principle of reparation into refugee status determination could result in a two-tier 
asylum system. Developing a response to this problem of prioritisation would partly 
require a VZLWFK IURP WKH µLGHDOLVWLF DSSURDFK¶ WR WKH HWKLFV RI DV\OXP ZKLFK KDV
ODUJHO\JXLGHGWKLVDUWLFOHWRDµUHDOLVWLFDSSURDFK¶ZKLFKDOVRWDNHVDFFRXQWRIVXFK
practical problems of implementation (Carens, 1996). This would allow the 
theoretical considerations which have dominated this article to be translated into 
proposals for workable improvements to current asylum systems worldwide. 
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